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Indeterminism in Kane’s Event-Causal Libertarianism 
 
ROBERT NOWELL  
Advisor: Dr. David Palmer 
 
 
Philosophy, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville
In this paper, I examine the plausibility of event-causal libertarianism, a prominent view 
on free will which regards indeterminism in the causal history of a decision as necessary 
for an agent’s moral responsibility for a subsequent action. Specifically, I investigate how 
Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarian account fares in light of Derk Pereboom’s powerful 
“disappearing agent” objection, in addition to criticisms of my own. Kane concludes that 
Pereboom’s objection is ineffective against his account. I argue against Kane’s conclusion 
by highlighting a dilemma which results from Kane’s response to the disappearing agent 
objection; either way Kane’s position is interpreted, his account is unsuccessful.
I 
$EULHIH[SODQDWLRQRI.DQH·VDFFRXQWLVDSSURSULDWH$QHYHQWFDXVDOOLEHUWDULDQ.DQH
holds the view that free and responsible actions are caused indeterministically by antecedent 
PHQWDOVWDWHVDQDJHQW·VUHDVRQVGHVLUHVHWF$FFRUGLQJWR.DQHSDUDGLJPDWLFIUHH
and responsible actions are the results of torn decisions1²´WKRVHLQZKLFKDQDJHQWKDVUHDVRQV
IRUWZRRUPRUHRSWLRQVDQGIHHOVWRUQDVWRZKLFKRIWKHVHWVRIUHDVRQVLVVWURQJHVWµS:KDW
PDNHVWKHDFWLRQVUHVXOWLQJIURPWRUQGHFLVLRQVIUHHDQGUHVSRQVLEOHDFFRUGLQJWR.DQHLVQRW
PHUHO\WKDWWKH\DUHXQGHWHUPLQHG,WLVDOVRWKDWDJHQWVKDYH´SOXUDOYROXQWDU\FRQWUROµZLWK
UHVSHFWWRWKHP²WKDWLV´WKH\DUHDEOHWREULQJDERXWZKLFKHYHURIWKHRSWLRQVRUFKRLFHVWKH\
will to bring about, when they will to do so, on purpose, rather than accidentally or inadvertently 
or by mistake, without being coerced or compelled in doing so or willing to do so or otherwise 
controlled in doing so or willing to do so by other agents or mechanisms” (p. 6).
.DQHDFNQRZOHGJHVWKDWLWLVGLIÀFXOWWRVHHKRZDQDJHQWPLJKWKDYHSOXUDOYROXQWDU\
control over a particular action if the action is undetermined (as in an event-causal situation) 
Indeed, indeterminism would seem to prevent the agent’s possession of plural voluntary 
FRQWUROE\UHQGHULQJWKHRXWFRPHRIKHUGHFLVLRQ´UDQGRPµ7RVKRZWKDWDQDJHQWZKRIDFHV
an undetermined decision can still have plural voluntary control with respect to that decision, 
.DQHPDNHVIRXUFODLPVÀUVWWKDWWKHUHVXOWVRIWRUQGHFLVLRQVDUHWKHUHVXOWVRIJRDO
GLUHFWHGSURFHVVHVLQWKHEUDLQZKLFKKHFDOOV´HIIRUWVRIZLOOµRU´YROLWLRQDOVWUHDPVµS
VHFRQG WKDW LQGHWHUPLQLVP´IXQFWLRQV DV D KLQGUDQFHRU REVWDFOH WR WKH DWWDLQPHQW RI >HDFK
HIIRUWRIZLOO@µSWKLUGWKDWWKHUHLVPRUHWKDQRQHDFWLYHHIIRUWRIZLOOZKHQDQDJHQWLV
facing a torn decisions (i.e., the agent is making at least two different efforts to do different 
WKLQJVDQGIRXUWKWKHDJHQWPXVWKDYHDFHUWDLQNLQGRIFRQWURORYHUHDFKRIWKHVHHIIRUWVRI
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.DQHDFNQRZOHGJHVWKDWLWLVGLIÀFXOWWRVHHKRZDQDJHQWPLJKWKDYHSOXUDOYROXQWDU\
control over a particular action if the action is undetermined (as in an event-causal situation) 
Indeed, indeterminism would seem to prevent the agent’s possession of plural voluntary 
FRQWUROE\UHQGHULQJWKHRXWFRPHRIKHUGHFLVLRQ´UDQGRPµ7RVKRZWKDWDQDJHQWZKRIDFHV
an undetermined decision can still have plural voluntary control with respect to that decision, 
.DQHPDNHVIRXUFODLPVÀUVWWKDWWKHUHVXOWVRIWRUQGHFLVLRQVDUHWKHUHVXOWVRIJRDO
GLUHFWHGSURFHVVHVLQWKHEUDLQZKLFKKHFDOOV´HIIRUWVRIZLOOµRU´YROLWLRQDOVWUHDPVµS
VHFRQG WKDW LQGHWHUPLQLVP´IXQFWLRQV DV D KLQGUDQFHRU REVWDFOH WR WKH DWWDLQPHQW RI >HDFK
HIIRUWRIZLOO@µSWKLUGWKDWWKHUHLVPRUHWKDQRQHDFWLYHHIIRUWRIZLOOZKHQDQDJHQWLV
facing a torn decisions (i.e., the agent is making at least two different efforts to do different 
WKLQJVDQGIRXUWKWKHDJHQWPXVWKDYHDFHUWDLQNLQGRIFRQWURORYHUHDFKRIWKHVHHIIRUWVRI
ZLOO´WHOHRORJLFDOJXLGDQFHFRQWUROµS
&UXFLDOO\´LWLVRZLQJWRWKLV>WHOHRORJLFDOJXLGDQFH@FRQWUROWKDWWKHFKRLFHWKDWUHVXOWV
from either of the [efforts of will] can be said to be brought about by the agent. And it is owing 
to the fact that either [effort of will] might succeed in attaining its goal, which would thereby 
be brought about by the agent’s goal-directed cognitive process, that the agent exercises plural 
YROXQWDU\ FRQWURO RYHU WKH GHFLVLRQ LWVHOIµ .DQH  S $FWLQJZLWK SOXUDO YROXQWDU\
FRQWUROHYHQWFDXVDODJHQWVLQ.DQH·VDFFRXQWDUHPRUDOO\UHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHLUDFWLRQV
II 
'HUN3HUHERRPKDVFRQFOXGHGWKDWHYHQWFDXVDODJHQWVLQ.DQH·VDFFRXQWDUHQRW
PRUDOO\UHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHLUDFWLRQVKLVUHDVRQVFRQVWLWXWHWKHGLVDSSHDULQJDJHQWREMHFWLRQ
This objection involves an agent facing an undetermined decision. At some point before an 
agent takes action, the agent’s causal contribution to the decision (her desires and reasons) 
DUH DFFRXQWHG IRU DQG VKHZLOO H[HUW QR DGGLWLRQDO LQÁXHQFH DIWHU WKLV SRLQW%XW FUXFLDOO\
whether or not the decision will occur is unresolved. Pereboom concludes that, given this state 
of affairs, no causal factor involving the agent determines whether or not the decision occurs, 
and he therefore asserts that event-causal agents are not morally responsible. The success of this 
REMHFWLRQZRXOGLPSHULOERWK.DQH·VSRVLWLRQDQGHYHQWFDXVDOOLEHUWDULDQLVPPRUHJHQHUDOO\
In essence, Pereboom’s argument is the following: In an event-causal decision,
(i) Prior causal factors allow that an agent’s decision could either occur or not occur
(ii) The agent plays no further causal role in determining whether the decision does 
or does not occur.
(iii) Therefore, the decision is not settled by any causal factor involving the agent, 
and the agent cannot be considered morally responsible for her action. 
,I 3HUHERRP·V DUJXPHQW LV VRXQG WKHQ .DQH·V HYHQWFDXVDO OLEHUWDULDQ DFFRXQW LV
undermined. 
III
.DQHUHIXWHV3HUHERRP·VFRQFOXVLRQFRPPHQWLQJWKDW3HUHERRP·VDUJXPHQWLVLQYDOLG
DJDLQVWKLVRZQDFFRXQW,W LV WUXH.DQHDUJXHV WKDWDQWHFHGHQWFDXVDOIDFWRUVDOORZWKDWDQ
agent’s decision could either occur or not occur, and also that the agent plays no further causal 
UROHLQGHWHUPLQLQJZKHWKHU WKHGHFLVLRQGRHVRUGRHVQRWRFFXU%XW.DQHVD\V WKH
question of the decision’s occurrence is resolved by a causal factor involving the agent. Namely, 
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ZKHWKHUWKHGHFLVLRQRFFXUV´LVVHWWOHGDWWKHPRPHQWRIFKRLFHE\WKHVXFFHVVIXOFRPSOHWLRQRI
the agent’s effort to bring about that choice” (p. 7). Even though antecedent events and states 
² LQFOXGLQJ DQ DJHQW·V IXOO FDXVDO FRQWULEXWLRQ WR DGHFLVLRQ² OHDYHRSHQZKHWKHU D FHUWDLQ
decision will or will not occur, the agent is responsible because the resolution of her decision 
amounts to an effort of will succeeding in expression. The successful expression of an agent’s 
efforts of will is a causal factor involving the agent, and so Pereboom’s conclusion is incorrect. 
$FFRUGLQJ WR.DQH WKHGLVDSSHDULQJDJHQWREMHFWLRQ LVXQVXFFHVVIXODJDLQVWKLVRZQHYHQW
causal account.
IV
.DQH·V UHVSRQVH WR 3HUHERRP·V GLVDSSHDULQJ DJHQW REMHFWLRQ LV LQHIIHFWLYH .DQH
maintains that the successful completion of an agent’s effort of will is a causal factor involving 
the agent, but, interestingly, it is still the case that there is a time before the decision is resolved 
at which point the agent plays no further causal role in resolving the decision. As a result, 
LW IROORZV WKDW DQDJHQWLQYROYLQJFDXVDO IDFWRU FDQH[HUW FDXVDO LQÁXHQFHZLWKRXW WKHDJHQW
SOD\LQJDFDXVDOUROH7KLVLVDFXULRXVUHVXOW$IXUWKHUFRQVHTXHQFHRI.DQH·VUHEXWWDOWRWKH
disappearing agent objection is that an agent can be responsible for an action without playing a 
FDXVDOUROHLQLWVÀQDOUHVROXWLRQ7KHVHLPSOLFDWLRQVDUHWURXEOHVRPHWKRXJK,DQWLFLSDWHWKDW
.DQHZRXOGRIIHUDFRQYLQFLQJUHVSRQVHWRWKLVLQLWLDOOLQHRIFULWLFLVP,WKHUHIRUHSURFHHGRQ
the assumption that an agent can be fairly considered to be morally responsible for an action as 
long as an agent-involving causal factor resolves her decision to act. If it is reasonable to believe 
that the occurrence of an agent’s torn decision can be resolved by an agent-involving causal 
factor, then Pereboom’s objection is ineffective. 
In the event-causal situation, it is uncontroversial to conclude that there exists some time 
prior to a decision’s resolution, t1, at which all agent-involving causal factors (reasons, desires, 
etc., and efforts of will) are accounted for – a point after which the agent exerts no more causal 
LQÁXHQFH²EXWWKHGHFLVLRQ·VRFFXUUHQFHLVVWLOOXQGHWHUPLQHG$W t1, there is more than one 
physically possible outcome for the agent’s decision at a temporally subsequent time, t2. 
6RZKDWRFFXUVDIWHUWVRWKDWWKHDJHQWGRHVRUGRHVQRWPDNHDGHFLVLRQDWW"7KDW
LV ZKDW VHWWOHVZKHWKHU WKH GHFLVLRQ LV WR RFFXU":HPLJKW XQGHUVWDQG.DQH WRPHDQ WKDW
the occurrence of indeterminate decisions is settled by an agent overcoming the obstacle of 
LQGHWHUPLQLVPE\PDNLQJDQHIIRUWRIZLOO .DQHHWDO%XW WKLVH[SODQDWLRQ LV
implausible in light of the disappearing agent objection.
Instead, another understanding of torn decision resolution is more appropriate. In his 
UHVSRQVHWRWKHGLVDSSHDULQJDJHQWREMHFWLRQ.DQHVD\VWKDWWKHGHFLVLRQ·VRFFXUUHQFH
is settled at the moment of choice by the successful completion of the agent’s effort to bring 
about that choice (p. 7). It is not immediately clear how this explanation might secure the 
DJHQW·VPRUDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\&DUHIXOO\H[DPLQLQJ.DQH·VFODLPVKRZVWKDWDQDJHQW·VGHFLVLRQ·V
occurrence cannot be settled by the successful completion of her effort of will, and this is 
because the settling of whether or not the decision occurs is the successful completion of an 
agent her effort of will.
.DQH·VH[SODQDWLRQLVWKDWWKHVXFFHVVRIDQDJHQW·VHIIRUWRIZLOOLVUHDOL]HGPDGHWR
be, causally brought about) by the agent’s effort of will succeeding, which is equivalent to the 
odd claim that something, D, is caused by D itself.  This kind of notion may be true, but only in 
DWULYLDODQGLQVXIÀFLHQWO\H[SODQDWRU\VHQVH'PD\FDXVDOO\HQWDLOWKDW'EXWWRH[SODLQWKDW
the determination of whether a decision will occur is settled by the determination of whether a 
GHFLVLRQZLOORFFXULVXQKHOSIXO:HGRQRWLQTXLUHKRZ'EHFRPHV'WKHTXHVWLRQLVKRZQRW'
becomes D. That is, how an in deterministic state of affairs with two possibilities (decision or 
non-decision, presumably) turns into an agent’s resolved decision. 
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V
.DQH·VH[SODQDWLRQRIWKHFDXVDOUHVROXWLRQRIHYHQWFDXVDOGHFLVLRQVLVLQVXIÀFLHQWDQG
the question remains of how an agent-involving causal factor might resolve whether or not an 
agent’s decision is to occur. To resolve this issue, a cogent understanding of indeterminism’s 
FDXVDOUROHLQ.DQH·VDFFRXQWLVHVVHQWLDO:HNQRZWKDWLQGHWHUPLQLVPSOD\VDFDXVDOUROHLQ
WKHRFFXUUHQFHRIGHFLVLRQV LQ.DQH·VDFFRXQW .DQHHWDOS ,DUJXH WKDW.DQH·V
explanation of indeterminacy is unclear, and this ambiguity places his account in the midst of a 
dilemma, both horns of which are detrimental.
7KHUHDUHWZRSRVVLEOHH[SODQDWLRQVRILQGHWHUPLQDF\RQ.DQH·VDFFRXQWLQGHWHUPLQLVP
functions either as an independent hindrance to each effort of will or as a kind of neural coin-
toss to determine whether a decision will occur. Whichever explanation of indeterminism is 
DFFHSWHG.DQH·VDFFRXQWFDQQRWEHGHVFULEHGLQDZD\WKDWVHFXUHVUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUHYHQW
causal agents. This presents a dilemma: his account is either incoherent or open to objection, 
DQGRQHLWKHUHQGRIWKLVGLOHPPD.DQH·VHYHQWFDXVDOOLEHUWDULDQLVPLVXQVXFFHVVIXO
Neural Coin-toss Indeterminacy
$ SODXVLEOH XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI LQGHWHUPLQDF\ LQ .DQH·V DFFRXQW LV WKH IROORZLQJ
indeterminacy is separate from agent-involving causal factors, and it becomes active after 
efforts of will (and all other agent-involving causal factors) are in place to determine whether an 
effort of will is to succeed in expression. This understanding of indeterminism, however, merely 
randomizes the whether or not event-causal decisions will occur, and it is therefore unhelpful 
HYHQWFDXVDOOLEHUWDULDQV&RQVWLWXWLQJWKHÀUVWKRUQRI.DQH·VGLOHPPDWKLVQHXUDOFRLQWRVV
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRILQGHWHUPLQDF\UHQGHUV.DQH·VDFFRXQWYXOQHUDEOHWRWKHGLVDSSHDULQJDJHQW
objection.
 If we interpret indeterminism as a neural coin-toss, no agent-involving causal factor 
settles whether an agent’s decision will occur. A revision of the disappearing agent objection 
could take the following form:
(i) The full causal contribution of antecedent agent-involving causal factors (reasons, 
desires, and efforts of will) allow that a decision could either occur or not occur
LL,QGHWHUPLQLVPIXQFWLRQVDVD´QHXUDOFRLQWRVVµZKLFKEHFRPHVDFWLYHDIWHUWKH
agent’s causal contribution to the decision is exhausted to determine whether or not 
the decision occurs.
(iii) The agent has no control over this neural coin-toss, and so this indeterminacy is 
not an agent-involving causal factor.
 (iv) The decision of whether the decision occurs is not settled by any causal factor 
involving the agent, so the agent cannot be considered morally responsible for her 
action. 
 Nothing about the agent causally determines the result of her decision, and therefore the 
agent is not morally responsible.5
 .DQHVHHPVWRKDYHUHFRJQL]HGWKDWHPEUDFLQJQHXUDOFRLQWRVVLQGHWHUPLQDF\OHDYHV
his event-causal account open to objection, and he has consistently rejected this understanding 
RI LQGHWHUPLQLVP   Though it offers a clear explanation of how the occurrence 
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RI HYHQWFDXVDO GHFLVLRQV LV VHWWOHG QHXUDO FRLQWRVV OHDYHV .DQH·V DJHQWV ZLWKRXW PRUDO
responsibility. 
Indeterministic Noise
7KH ÀUVW DVSHFW RI .DQH·V GLOHPPD OHDYHV HYHQWFDXVDO DJHQWV ZLWKRXW PRUDO
responsibility. The second entails that his account is incoherent. Rejecting a neural coin-toss 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRILQGHWHUPLQDF\.DQHKDVUHFHQWO\GHVFULEHGWKHFDXVDOUROHRILQGHWHUPLQDF\
DV´LQGHWHUPLQLVWLFQRLVHZKLFKLVSURYLGLQJDQREVWDFOHWR>DQDJHQW·V@RYHUFRPLQJWHPSWDWLRQµ
S7KHUHIHUHQFHG¶RYHUFRPLQJWHPSWDWLRQ·OLNHO\GHQRWHVDQDJHQW·VHIIRUWRIZLOO
Describing the relation of an agent’s effort of will to indeterminism, .DQHDVVHUWV WKDW´RQH
PXVW WKLQNRI WKH HIIRUW DQG WKH LQGHWHUPLQLVPDV IXVHG WKH HIIRUW LV LQGHWHUPLQDWH DQG WKH
indeterminism is a property of the effort, not something separate that occurs after or before 
WKHHIIRUWµS+HFRQWLQXHVWRH[SODLQWKDW´FKDQFHZDVFDXVDOO\LQYROYHGµLQWKH
GHFLVLRQ·VUHVROXWLRQEXW´RQHFDQQRWVHSDUDWHWKHLQGHWHUPLQLVPDQGWKHHIIRUWRIZLOOVRWKDW
ÀUVWWKHHIIRUWRFFXUVIROORZHGE\FKDQFHRUOXFNRUYLFHYHUVDµSS
It appears that we should understand indeterminacy as a hindrance to the success of each 
effort of will independently. That is, an effort of will is an agent’s attempt to perform a certain 
action, but the effort of will is indeterministic in the sense that whether or not it will succeed in 
DFWLRQLVXQGHWHUPLQHGWKHUHLVDFHUWDLQSUREDELOLW\WKDWHDFKHIIRUWZLOOVXFFHHG´GHVSLWHWKH
SUREDELOLW\RUFKDQFHRIIDLOXUHµS. 
This interpretation of indeterminism brings about an issue for an account which holds 
that more than one effort of will can (and must) be active at t1 .DQH SUHVHQWV D VLWXDWLRQ
wherein two efforts have independent probabilities for success in action, and, consequently, 
both efforts of will could succeed.6 This is impossible because torn decisions often include an 
agent who is deciding between mutually exclusive options (either a businesswoman can decide 
to help an assault victim or she can make it to an important business meeting). 
+HQFHZHÀQGWKHVHFRQGKRUQRI.DQH·VGLOHPPD.DQH·VDFFRXQWLVLQFRKHUHQWEHFDXVH
it provides for the simultaneous expression of mutually exclusive actions. If we understand 
LQGHWHUPLQLVP DV DQ LQGHSHQGHQW KLQGUDQFH WR HDFK HIIRUW RIZLOO·V H[SUHVVLRQ WKHQ.DQH·V
alteration secures an agent’s responsibility either way a decision results at the cost of the his 
account’s coherence.
VI
Some explanation which clears up how the undetermined state of affairs at t1 can be 
causally transformed into an agent’s performing a certain action at t2PXVWEHRIIHUHG.DQH·V
RZQH[SODQDWLRQLVLQVXIÀFLHQWDQGWKLVOHDYHVXVZLWKWKHTXHVWLRQRIKRZWKHRFFXUUHQFHRIDQ
DJHQW·VLVVHWWOHGDV.DQHFODLPVE\DFDXVDOIDFWRULQYROYLQJWKHDJHQW$FOHDUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI
LQGHWHUPLQLVPLQ.DQH·VDFFRXQWLVHVVHQWLDOWRDQVZHULQJWKLVTXHVWLRQEXW.DQH·VDPELJXRXV
explanation of the causal role of indeterminism entails a dilemma. 
,QGHWHUPLQLVP LQ .DQH·V HYHQWFDXVDO OLEHUWDULDQLVP FDQ EH XQGHUVWRRG DV FDXVDOO\
functioning in one of two ways: either indeterminism settles the occurrence of the agent’s 
decision as a neural coin-toss, or indeterminism functions in each effort of will independently 
DV´LQGHWHUPLQLVWLFQRLVHµ Consequently, his account either depicts agents whose decisions are 
resolved by chance, or it allows an agent to simultaneously perform mutually exclusive actions. 
The former leaves event-causal agents without moral responsibility, while the latter renders his 
account incoherent. 
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Endnotes
1. 7KURXJKRXWWKLVSDSHUWKHSKUDVHV´WKHGHFLVLRQ·VRFFXUUHQFHµ´ZKHWKHURUQRWGHFLVLRQZLOO
RFFXUµDQG´WKHRFFXUUHQFHRIWKHDJHQW·VGHFLVLRQµDUHWUHDWHGDVHTXLYDOHQW6SHFLÀFSKUDVLQJ
is merely stylistic.
 This explanation is ineffective because, as discussed, the causal effect of the agent’s efforts of 
ZLOOLVDFFRXQWHGIRUDWWLPHWWKHDJHQWH[HUWVQRPRUHFDXVDOLQÁXHQFHDIWHUWZKLFKPHDQV
the agent makes no new efforts after t1. So, an agent’s ‘making an effort’ cannot resolve the 
decision’s occurrence because whether or not it will occur is unresolved even after her efforts 
of will are in place at time t1.
 A question remains: once it has been determined that a decision will occur, which effort of will 
is to succeed? For now, I assume that an agent can be responsible for an action as long as the 
action is the result of a successful effort of will, even if the agent does not cause the occurrence 
RIWKHVSHFLÀFDFWLRQVKHWDNHV
 A key assumption for this objection is that, to be morally responsible, a causal factor involving the 
agent must be determine an agent makes a decision. This is a mostly uncontroversial assumption, 
DQGLWLVRQHZLWKZKLFK.DQHZRXOGOLNHO\DJUHH,QKLVGHÀQLWLRQRISOXUDOYROXQWDU\FRQWURO
.DQHVSHFLÀHVWKDWPRUDOO\UHVSRQVLEOHDJHQWV´DUHDEOHWREULQJDERXWZKLFKHYHURIWKHRSWLRQV
or choices they will to bring about, when they will to do so, on purpose, rather than accidentally 
RULQDGYHUWHQWO\RUE\PLVWDNHµ.DQH
5. It is also the case that both efforts of will could fail, resulting in an agent’s inaction. This could 
also bring about some odd situations, particularly when inaction is physically impossible. This 
issue brings about further questions concerning whether or not an agent an agent must be able 
to settle her own decision’s occurrence.
6. It is also the case that both efforts of will could fail, resulting in an agent’s inaction. This could 
also bring about some odd situations, particularly when inaction is physically impossible. This 
issue brings about further questions concerning whether or not an agent an agent must be able 
to settle her own decision’s occurrence.
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